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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003130

SIPDIS

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TAGS: PREL CY TU

SUBJECT: CYPRUS FOLLOW-ON: U.S. AND UK AMBASSADORS' JUNE 4
MEETING WITH MFA U/S ZIYAL

REF: ANKARA 2898

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

¶11. (C) Summary: Turks express reservations on two points in UNSYG's Cyprus good offices report but grudgingly agree the report is helpful. Turkey sees the Russians as unhelpful in the UNSC and seeks a UNSC outcome that does the most to end northern Cyprus' isolation -- probably a simple UNSC endorsement of the report followed by strong statements by the U.S., UK and a few others. Turkey also considers the Annan Plan phrase "Turkish Cypriot State" to be the minimum acceptable point of reference, but will not seek recognition of the TRNC as an independent state. End summary.

¶12. (C) Calling in U.S. and UK Ambassadors June 4 to discuss how to proceed on Cyprus, MFA U/S Ziyal and Deputy U/S Ilkin characterized UNSYG Annan's Cyprus good offices report as "the least that could be done" (Ziyal) and "relatively objective" (Ilkin). The Turks proceeded to lay out two points of concern for Ankara:

--the UNSYG's apparent interpretation that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee gives no right of unilateral intervention (UNSYG report, para 61);

--the report states that the UNSC would be "well advised to stand ready to address" lingering Greek Cypriot security concerns, perhaps through a resolution.

¶13. (C) Ziyal reiterated what he said he had emphasized to SCC Weston in Burgenstock: any change in the definition or scope of guarantor status would be rejected by Ankara as a deal-breaker. What the Greek Cypriots asked for they got at Burgenstock, he added. What the Turks asked for, they got, thanks to the U.S. and UK. What made the Annan Plan work was the trade-off of guarantees for the Turks/Turkish Cypriots and functionality for the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots did not raise these security concerns at Burgenstock. No one should open the door to them now. Opening the door will only encourage Papadopoulos to become even more intransigent in asserting that he is the government of Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriots should join him.

¶14. (C) Regarding UNSC action, the key would be the Council's willingness to declare that UNSCs 541 and 550 should not be interpreted as requiring an embargo of northern Cyprus. In terms of what Turkey would like to see coming out of the UNSC, Ziyal and Ilkin reiterated (reftel) that the Russians are being unhelpful: "the Gul-Lavrov discussions in Moscow went badly." Turkey needs to be realistic, Ilkin continued; if it's clear a satisfactory UNSCR or presidential statement is not in the cards, then Turkey would prefer a simple UNSC endorsement followed by strongly worded national statements by the U.S., UK and some others under the coordinated statement procedure.

¶15. (C) In response, both Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott pointed out why the UNSYG report is balanced. Edelman emphasized that the USG continues to believe the Annan Plan offers the best basis for a settlement and there is no disposition to re-open the text. Westmacott added that the Russians' unrelenting pro-Greek Cypriot stance stems in part from Putin's wish to remind everyone that Russia is still a major player and isn't to be taken for granted.

¶16. (C) Turning to other next steps, Ilkin noted that Ankara is searching for a way to clarify definitively Turkey's view of "Cyprus"-in-the-EU as the "Greek Cypriot State". Ziyal underscored that Ankara cannot retreat from the Annan Plan phrase "Turkish Cypriot State". At the upcoming OIC summit in Istanbul Turkey wants to renew the Turkish Cypriots' status as observers under the name "Turkish Cypriot State" but clearly labeling it as having that name under the ambit

of the Annan Plan. Turkey would not, however, try to push beyond this change of nameplate to seek recognition. There is pressure from the Russians not to seek the change, but Ankara is confident it can handle the Russians since they seek observer status. Crucial will be U.S. and UK agreement not to lobby against the change.

17. (C) The Ambassadors reviewed U.S. and UK step-by-step moves to end northern Cyprus' isolation. Westmacott noted that making a breakthrough in ICAO would be helped if the EU could achieve consensus. In this regard, Verheugen appears strongly positive.
EDELMAN